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to be considered a trade or business.13  For a lessor who is
the sole employee of the entity as lessee, the task of
resisting an I.R.S. assertion of trade or business status for
the lessor is the most difficult.  Certainly anyone leasing
personal property — or even real property — to a lessee for
which they are rendering services should use care to develop
the strongest possible case for passive investor status rather
than trade or business status.  That means the lease should
be drafted to place responsibility for maintenance and repair
on the lessee, for example, and the lessee should avoid
involvement as lessee in management or decision making
relative to the property under the lease.
FOOTNOTES
1 T.C. Memo. 1989-357.
2 Id.
3 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
4 I.R.C. § 1402(b).
5 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
6 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
10
  Id.  See 4 Harl, Agricultural
Law § 37.03[3] (1991).
1 1 Id.
1 2 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
1 3 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor claimed as a business
homestead property leased to the debtor's wholly-owned
corporation.  The court held that the debtor was allowed a
business homestead exemption in the property.  In re
John Taylor Co., 935 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1991).
The debtor claimed a rural homestead exemption for two
lots of land in a rural subdivision located outside a city
limits.  The lots were contiguous except that a county road
by easement passed over the line between the lots.  The
court held that the debtor was entitled to a rural homestead
exemption because the subdivision did not have the
characteristics (no local government, businesses or schools)
of a city, town or village.  Both lots were included in the
exemption because the lots were contiguous except for the
road and the debtor treated the properties as one.  In re
Weaver, 128 B.R. 234 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1991).
Although the debtors signed an agreement with the
trustee that the debtors' interests in an ERISA-qualified
retirement plan were estate property and not exempt, the
employer and plan administrator argued that the interests
were exempt under Missouri law.  The court held that the
Missouri exemption for retirement plans was pre-empted by
ERISA.  In re  Carver, 128 B.R. 239 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1990).
The trustee filed an objection to the debtor's claimed
exemption of an interest in a pension plan.  The objection
was denied because the trustee failed to file the proof of
service.  The trustee filed a second objection, with proof of
service, after the date for filing objections.  The bankruptcy
court had allowed the late objection, holding that the
objection related back to the timely first objection.  The
district court held that the second objection did not relate
back and was untimely.  The case did not raise the issue of
whether the exemption would be allowed even without a
proper objection as was discussed in a couple of recent
cases.  (See In re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1990)
p. 47 supra and In re Kazi, 125 B.R. 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1991) p. 99 supra)  Nuttleman v. Myers, 128 B . R .
254 (D. Neb. 1991).
The debtor had filed a Chapter 13 case in which the plan
was confirmed.  The debtor had claimed as exempt interests
in two IRA's.  The debtor converted the case to Chapter 7
and the trustee objected to the exemptions for the interests
in the IRA's, arguing that a recent state case had declared the
exemptions unconstitutional.  The court held that the debtor
was not entitled to the exemptions because as of the date of
the conversion, the exemptions were not allowed.  In re
Marcus, 128 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
The debtor claimed the Massachusetts $100,000
exemption for a homestead with a fair market value of
$140,000 and $50,000 of equity, with the intent to avoid
liens against the home.  A creditor with a lien against the
home argued that the exemption be applied to the fair
market value of the home before deducting any liens against
the home.  The court held that the exemption applied to the
debtor's equity and that liens could be avoided to the extent
the debtor's exemption would be impaired.  In re
Giarrizzo, 128 B.R. 321 (Bankr. D. Mass .
1991) .
The debtor claimed an exemption, under Ohio law, of a
homestead and sought avoidance of a lien impairing the
exemption.  The lien creditor had obtained relief from the
stay to proceed to foreclosure on the home.  The court held
that the homestead exemption does not arise until
execution, attachment or sale of the residence and that the
lien may not be avoided until one of those actions has been
taken.  However, because an attempt to avoid a lien at the
time of sale would be difficult, the court held that upon the
filing of the praecipe for issuance of the order for the sale,
the debtor may file for lien avoidance.  In re  Cardwell,
128 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY.  The debtor
owned a residence with the nondebtor spouse as tenants by
the entirety and the trustee sought court approval for the
sale of the debtor's interest to the nondebtor spouse for the
fair market value of the debtor's interest, as an entirety
interest in the property.  The sole creditor objected to the
sale by claiming that the sale would remove estate property
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for less value than would be otherwise available to the
creditor.  The court held that the sale would not result in
less property for the creditor because the creditor could not
force partition of the property because the harm to the
nondebtor spouse's interest would exceed the benefit to the
bankruptcy estate or the creditor.  The court noted that the
nondebtor spouse had contributed to the cost of the
residence, the spouse would recognize $20,000 tax liability
from a partition and the spouse would not be able to
purchase another residence in the community, an Orthodox
Jewish neighborhood close to a synogogue.  In re
Waxman, 128 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1991).
  CHAPTER 12
CONVERSION.  The debtors had filed for Chapter 13
two weeks before enactment of Chapter 12 and sought
avoidance of a lien as a preferential transfer.  The lien was
avoided but the debtors then sought conversion to Chapter
12.  The bankruptcy court would not allow conversion but
allowed the debtors to dismiss the Chapter 13 case and refile
for Chapter 12.  The filing of the Chapter 12 petition,
however, was more than 90 days after the attachment of the
avoided lien and the creditor argued that the lien could no
longer be avoided as a preferential transfer.  The district
court affirmed the conversion tactic and held that the lien
remained avoided under the equity jurisdiction of Section
349.  The appellate court held that the conversion tactic was
improper and that the debtor should have the advantage of
the Chapter 12 filing and the avoidance of the lien.  The
court held that the lien was no longer avoidable as a
preferential transfer because the lien attached more than 90
days before the Chapter 12 filing.  Matter of Sadler,
935 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1991).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS .  The
debtor's Chapter 11 liquidating plan provided for payments
of principal of unpaid withholding taxes before payment of
penalties and interest.  The court held that the debtor may
not force allocation of tax payments in a Chapter 11
liquidating plan.  In re Kare Kemical, Inc., 9 3 5
F.2d 243 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'g , 90-1 U . S . T . C .
¶ 50,044 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
After the debtor's Chapter 11 plan had been substantially
performed, the debtor sought an order requiring the IRS to
apply tax payments first to trust fund claims.  The IRS
argued that Section 1101(2)(A) prevented late modification
of plans after substantial performance.  The court held that a
court order allocation of plan payments of taxes was not a
modification of the plan but an assertion of the court's
continuing authority to supervise the plan.  United
States v. APT Industries, Inc., 128 B.R. 1 4 5
(W.D. N.C. 1991).
AUTOMATIC STAY .  The debtor had filed a
bankruptcy case with a former spouse but was dismissed
from that case.  The debtor commenced a new bankruptcy
case and during that case the IRS improperly withheld
income tax refunds due to the debtor, resulting from a
computer error which continued to link the debtor with the
previous case.  The IRS had not filed any claim in the
current case and asserted no claims against the debtor or the
debtor's estate.  The debtor sought compensatory and
punitive damages against the IRS for repeated violations of
the automatic stay.  The court held that the IRS had not
waived immunity under Section 106 because the IRS had
not filed a claim and had no claim against the debtor or the
debtor's estate.  Matter of Cowart, 128 B.R. 4 9 2
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1990).
TAXABLE YEAR ELECTION.  An involuntary
Chapter 11 case was filed against the debtor and an order for
relief was entered.  The debtor filed an election to close the
taxable year as of the day before the order for relief was
granted.  The election was filed within four and one-half
months after the close of the short taxable year but more
than four and one-half months after the involuntary petition
was filed.  The IRS argued that the date of the involuntary
petition was the commencement of the case.  The court held
that the commencement of an involuntary case is the date
the order for relief is made.  In re  Kreidle, 91-2 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,371 (Bankr. D. C o l o .
1991) .
TRUSTEE LIABILITY.  The Chapter 7 trustee filed
the income tax return for the debtor corporation six months
late and requested the expedited audit procedure of Section
505(b).  The IRS did not respond within the time limits of
Section 505 but later assessed penalties and interest for the
late filing of the return.  The court held that because the
IRS did not timely respond to the expedited audit request,
the IRS was barred from assessing any penalties or interest.
In re  Carie Corp., 128 B.R. 266 (D. Alaska
1989) .
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The debtors entered into
an agreement with the defendant bank to deed farmland to
the bank and to lease the land back to the debtors for two
years.  The agreement reserved all rights of the debtors under
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.  The bank had the land
appraised in three tracts and offered the tracts for sale at the
appraised value to the debtors who presented a counteroffer
which was refused.  Two of the tracts were sold to third
parties for more than the appraised value and the debtors
argued that the sale of the two tracts violated the agreement
and the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.  The court held that
the division of the farmland into three tracts did not violated
the 1987 Act and the sale of the two tracts on different
terms than were offered to the debtors did not violate the
1987 Act where the different terms applied only because the
bank did not have possession.  K Lazy K Ranch, Inc.
v. Farm Credit Bank of Omaha, 127 B.R. 1 0 1 4
(D. S.D. 1991).
The debtors sought an injunction to prohibit a farm
credit bank from selling farm land transferred to the bank
under a bankruptcy case agreement.  The debtors alleged that
the sale would violate the debtors' right of first refusal under
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.  The court held that the
1987 Act did not provide a private right of action to enforce
the right of first refusal.  In re  Jarrett Ranches,
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Inc.,128 B.R. 263 (D. S.D. 1990), rev'g, 1 0 7
B.R. 963 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1989).
In response to the plaintiff's action to foreclose on
farmland as collateral for the defendant's loan, the defendants
argued that the plaintiff was required to participate in
mediation before bringing a foreclosure action.  The court
held that under 7 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106, mediation was not
required before foreclosure could be allowed.  Federal
Land Bank v. Northcutt, 811 P.2d 1368 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1991).
PRICE SUPPORT AND PRODUCTION
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS .  The CCC has issued
proposed rules concerning the eligibility of landlords for
production adjustment programs.  The proposed rules clarify
the CCC definition of cash and share leases.  A lease is
considered a cash lease if the landowner receives a sum
certain cash payment or specified quantity of the crop.  A
lease is a share lease if the landowner receives a specific
share of the crop or a specified share of the proceeds of a
crop.  For leases with a combination of the above
characteristics, a cash lease results if the cash payment
exceeds one-half of the landowner's total expected return or
the expected share amount if the lease provides for payment
of the larger of a specified cash amount or a specified share.
Otherwise, for mixed leases, the lease is a share lease.  5 6
Fed. Reg. 40272, (Aug. 14, 1991), amending 7
C.F.R. § 1413.111(b).
The CCC has issued proposed regulations making
discretionary determinations under FACTA 1990: (1)
advance deficiency payments for 1992-1995 wheat, feed
grains, upland cotton and rice will be 40 percent of the
projected payment rate, with no advance payments for ELS
cotton; (2) no change in the types of crops which may be
planted on flex acres; (3)  planting of oats on wheat or feed
grains ACR will not be allowed for 1992; and (4) planting
of conserving crops on ACR will not be allowed for 1992.
56 Fed. Reg. 41082, Aug. 19, 1991).
WETLANDS.  The SCS in conjunction with the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Interior has issued
proposed revisions to the "Federal Manual for Identifying
and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands."  The manual
provides guidance for determining wetlands for various
federal programs.  56 Fed. Reg. 40416 (Aug. 1 4 ,
1991) .
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  The decedent's
estate included an operating hotel which was continued by
the estate executor for almost two years before the hotel was
sold.  The executor sought an administrative deduction for
the ordinary and necessary business expenses of operating
the hotel during the estate operation.  The IRS ruled that the
expenses went beyond the settling of the estate affairs and
were not deductible as administrative expenses.  Ltr. R u l .
9132003, April 29, 1991.
ALLOCATION OF TAXES .  The decedent's will
directed that the executrix should pay all estate taxes
"without regard to whether such taxes be payable by my
estate or by any beneficiary."  Under Indiana law, unless the
will otherwise directs, estate taxes are not to be paid from
property eligible for a charitable, marital or other deduction.
The court held that the will overrode the Indiana apportion-
ment statute and provided for equal apportionment of estate
taxes against all property, thus decreasing the property
passing to the surviving spouse eligible for the marital
deduction.  Ransburg v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) § 60,081 (S.D. Ind. 1991), aff'g o n
point on rehearing, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 60,052 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
BELOW MARKET INTEREST RATE
LOANS.  The donors sold their farm land to their children
under a 30 year contract at 6 percent interest.  The IRS
argued that the market rate of interest of 11 percent caused a
gift of the difference in the interest rates. The donors argued
that I.R.C. § 483 applied to allow the 6 percent interest.
The court held that section 483 did not apply to federal gift
tax law and that the IRS rate would be used to determine the
imputed interest and value of the gift.  The case is not in
accord with Ballard v. Comm'r, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1988).  Krabbenhoft v. Comm'r, 91-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) § 60,080 (8th Cir. 1991), aff'g, 9 4
T.C. 887 (1990).
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT.  The
decedent received an interest in an IRA owned by a
predeceased person.  Under the IRA provisions, if the
decedent died before all funds were distributed, the remaining
amounts were to be distributed to third parties.  Upon the
decedent's death, the executor sought contribution for the
federal and state estate taxes attributable to the IRA amounts
included in the decedent's estate.  The surviving beneficiaries
made the payments by directing the IRA trustee to distribute
funds to the decedent's estate.  The IRS ruled that the
payments to the estate were income in respect of decedent.
Ltr. Rul. 9132021, May 2, 1991.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's
surviving spouse and children were residuary beneficiaries
under the decedent's will.  Under a settlement agreement, the
amount to be distributed to the children was established in
an attempt to discern the real intent of the decedent.  The
court held that the amounts passing to the children under the
settlement agreement did not pass first to the surviving
spouse so as to be includible in the marital deduction share.
Est. of Ransburg v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) § 60,081 (S.D. Ind. 1991), rev'g o n
point on rehearing, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 60,052 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
   TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
The decedent owned unimproved rural land, one-half as
beneficiary of a trust for life and one-half in fee.  The
decedent created a partnership and contributed the decedent's
one-half fee interest in the land to the partnership and
transferred general and limited partnership interests to the
decedent's children and grandchildren.  In a subsequent year,
the decedent transferred more partnership interests to the
same partners.  The partnership attempted to sell the land as
residential development but was unable to do so by the
decedent's death because of zoning restrictions.  The IRS
ruled that because the decedent owed the other partners the
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fiduciary duty of a general partner, the transfers of the
partnership interests were gifts of present interests.  Also
because of this fiduciary duty, the decedent's management
control was not a retained interest in the transferred
partnership interest such as to include them in the decedent's
estate under Section 2036.  Ltr. Rul. 9131006, April
30, 1991.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AT RISK.  The taxpayer partnership owned barges
operated on the Mississippi river by a corporation
comprised of the partners of the barge owning partnership as
shareholders.  In the years the partnership has a loss from
the barge operation, the corporation paid the partnership
expenses to the extent of the losses, including debt service
on the loans made to acquire the barges.  The amounts so
paid were charged against an "affiliate account."  The IRS
ruled that the arrangement was a management contract and
the partners could not include the amount in the affiliate
account as amounts at-risk in the partnership. Ltr. R u l .
9132004, April 30, 1991.
COOPERATIVES.  An exempt farm cooperative was
required to make an emergency purchase of normally
member-produced crops from a nonmember producer in
another country in order to fulfill pre-existing orders.  The
IRS ruled that, under Rev. Rul. 69-222, 1969-1 C.B. 161,
the emergency purchase to fulfill pre-existing orders would
not change the cooperative's exempt status.  Ltr. R u l .
9132028, May 13, 1991.
DEPRECIATION.  A rancher claimed depreciation
and investment tax credit from the purchase of cattle by one
corporation owned by the rancher to another corporation
owned by the rancher.  The court denied the deductions and
credits from the sale because the taxpayer failed to produce
evidence of a sale transaction.  Johnson v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1991-346.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  In a case
which illustrates the danger of selling assets before filing
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a farm debtor was held to have
recognized gain from the pre-bankruptcy sale of farm
equipment with the proceeds used to reduce debt secured by
the equipment.  Thus, the debtor was personally liable for
the federal income tax on the gain.  The court held that
I.R.C. § 108 (nonrecognition of discharge of indebtedness
income) did not apply because indebtedness was not
forgiven but only reduced by the amount of proceeds
generated by the sale of the equipment.  [Had the debtor
disposed of the equipment after filing of bankruptcy, gain
from the sale or transfer to the secured creditor would be
recognized by the bankruptcy estate.  See Harl,
Agricultural Law, § 39.02 (1991).]  In re  Brubeck,
91-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,364 (S.D. Ind.
1991), aff'g , 90-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,046 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989).
FAMILY ESTATE TRUSTS.  The defendants sold
trust packages under which personal assets were transferred
to domestic trusts owned by foreign trusts used to evade
income tax on personal income.  The defendants were
convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States and
appealed the conviction, arguing that the convictions were
not supported by the evidence.  The court held that the
defendants' appearances at the sales seminars, preparation of
income tax forms and service as trustees for the sham trusts
were sufficient evidence to link the defendants to the
conspiracy.  United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d
1422 (10th Cir. 1990).
IRA'S.  The taxpayer withdrew amounts from three
IRA's for use to pay tax liability of the taxpayer's former
spouse according to the divorce decree.  The court held that
the amounts withdrawn were includible in the taxpayer's
gross income because neither the IRA's nor the funds were
transferred to the former spouse and the former spouse's tax
liability became the taxpayer's under the divorce decree.
Harris v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-375.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.  A partnership
operating an ethanol distillation plant was not allowed
investment tax credit for the facility until the taxable year
the facility could produce the intended product.  Valley
Natural Fuels v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-
341 .
The taxpayers were denied investment tax credit for
rehabilitation expenses for a certified historic building where
the total expenses did not exceed the total basis of the
building.  The court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to
separate the expenses for the first floor which exceeded the
first floor's share of the building's basis.  Alexander v .
Comm'r, 97 T.C. No. 15 (1991).
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION.  The taxpayer
owned timberland which received damage from hurricane
Hugo.  The taxpayer realized gain from dead and damaged
timber under Section 631(a) and (b) and from sales.  The
taxpayer used the proceeds of the damaged timber for
reforestation expenses, including the replanting of trees and
the repairing of drains, fences and timberland roads.  The
IRS ruled that the gains realized from Sections 631(a) and
(b) and sales resulted from an involuntary conversion and
the reforestation expenses constituted replacement property
resulting in no tax liability if made within the time
limitations of Section 1033(a)(2)(B).  Ltr. R u l .
9131034, May 3, 1991.
PREPRODUCTION EXPENSES .  The IRS has
issued proposed rules governing the capitalization of
preproduction interest on all real property (includes crops
with a preproductive period of more than two years) and
personal property with a class life of 20 years or more, an
estimated preproduction period of more than two years, or
an estimated production period of more than one year and an
estimated cost of production of more than $1 million.  The
amount of interest required to be capitalized is to be
determined under the cost avoidance method.  The proposed
rules are effective for taxable years beginning after the rules
become final.  56 Fed. Reg. 40815 (Aug. 1 6 ,
1991), adding Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263A(f)-1
through 1.263A(f)-9.
  PARTNERSHIPS  
LIABILITIES.  The IRS has issued proposed regulations
to replace the temporary regulations concerning the
allocation of recourse and nonrecourse partnership liabilities
150                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Agricultural Law Digest
among the partners.  Under the proposed regulations, a
partnership liability is considered a recourse liability as to a
partner if the partner bears the economic risk for the
liability, including under a constructive liquidation analysis.
A constructive liquidation involves an analysis of the
partner's share of the liability in the event of a liquidation of
the partnership in which, under the partnership agreement,
the partner would be required to pay the liability.  A
constructive liquidation includes liquidation of the
partnership, worthlessness of all partnership assets, taxable
disposal of all partnership assets, allocation of partnership
tax items to the partners, and immediate payment of
partnership liabilities.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1 .752 -
2(b).  Nonrecourse liabilities are to be allocated first
according to the partners' share of minimum or taxable gain.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a).  Economic risk also
exists where a partner assumes liability for a partnership
obligation so that the partnership may obtain the
obligation, the partner's assumption removes the lender's
risk for the partnership obligation, and the partner assumes
the risk for the obligation with the intent to allow other
partners to include the obligation in their bases in the
partnership.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(2) .  If
the partner pledges property with an ascertainable fair
market value, the value of that property must be recomputed
over the life of the partnership obligation, but if the market
value of the pledged property is not readily ascertainable, the
fair market value of the property is to be determined only as
of the time of the pledge.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
2(h).  If more than 25 percent of the interest accruing on a
partnership obligation is guaranteed by partners, the
guarantors will be considered to bear the economic risk of
the present value of the guaranteed interest payments.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e) .  A partner with 10
percent or less of an interest in partnership tax items is not
considered at risk as to partnership nonrecourse obligations.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(d) .  56 Fed. R e g .
37083 (Aug. 2, 1991).
LOSS.  A limited partner abandoned an interest in a
partnership after the partnership's main asset, a motion
picture, was acquired by the executive producer.  The court
held that the taxpayer could claim an ordinary loss for the
interest where the partnership had no liabilities at the time
of the abandonment.  Citron v. Comm'r, 97 T . C .
No. 12 (1991).
RETIREMENT PLANS .  The IRS has issued
procedures for a mass submitter or sponsoring organization
to obtain an opinion letter for a prototype simplified
employee pension agreement that provides for contributions
pursuant to an employee's election under Section 408(k)(6).
The revenue procedure contains a model agreement and two
other formats for sponsors to use to add elective deferral
provisions to existing prototype SEP's.  Rev. Proc. 9 1 -
44, I.R.B. 1991-31, 25.
The self-employed taxpayer was not allowed a deduction
for contributions to a defined benefit plan where the
taxpayer failed to show that the trust agreement to adopt the
plan was in existence in the taxable year the deduction was
claimed.  Attardo v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-
357 .
The IRS has issued procedures for qualify a cash or
deferred arrangement (CODA) for plans which did not make
the election provided in Notice 88-127, 198-2 C.B. 538.
Rev. Proc. 91-47, I.R.B. 1991-34, Aug. 8 ,
1991 .
  S    CORPORATIONS  .
 ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The S corporation
tax matters partner (TMP) timely filed a petition for
readjustment in response to an IRS final S corporation
administrative adjustment.  The court assessed penalties for
delay against the TMP because the TMP failed to appear at
the trial, respond to court orders or substantiate the claims
in the petition.  The court did not assess the penalties
against the other shareholders who did not take part in the
proceedings.  Rollercade, Inc. v. Comm'r, 97 T . C .
No. 8 (1991).
CLASS OF STOCK.  The IRS has issued proposed
rules replacing previously issued proposed regulations (see 1
Agric. Law Dig. 205(1990)) concerning the one class of
stock requirement for S corporation status.  Under the
proposed regulations, a corporation has more than one class
of stock if the outstanding shares do not confer identical
rights to distributions and liquidation proceeds, including
distributions that vary with respect to timing or amount.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(1).    Thus, if all shares of
stock of an S corporation have identical rights to
distribution and liquidation proceeds, the corporation may
have voting and nonvoting common stock, a class of stock
which may vote only on certain issues, irrevocable proxy
agreements or groups of shares that differ with respect to
rights to elect members of the board of directors.
The definition of distribution includes all definitions
under the Code and general principles of federal tax law.
The determination of whether all outstanding shares of stock
confer identical rights to distribution and liquidation
proceeds is based on the articles of incorporation, bylaws,
applicable state law and any binding agreements relating to
distribution or liquidation, referred to as "governing
provisions."  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(i).  A
routine commercial contractual arrangement such as a lease,
employment or loan agreement, is not considered to be a
governing provision unless entered into to circumvent the
one class of stock requirement.  The regulations specify
several exceptions-
• Agreements to redeem or purchase stock at death,
disability or termination of employment are disregarded in
determining whether a corporation's outstanding shares of
stock confer identical distribution and liquidation rights.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(iii).
• Rights under bona fide buy-sell agreements and
restrictions on transferability of stock are not considered to
create a second class of stock unless the agreement is used
to circumvent the one class of stock requirement and the
agreement sets a purchase price significantly different from
the fair market value of the stock.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1361-1(l)(2)(iii).
Outstanding stock does not include nonvested stock
unless the shareholder elects under Section 83(b) and does
not include deferred compensation arrangements which
involve property not subject to Section 83.  Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1361-1(b)(3),(4).  Differences in voting rights and
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           151
restrictions on transferability of stock are not considered to
create a second class of stock unless the agreement is used
to circumvent the one class of stock requirement and the
agreement sets a purchase price significantly different from
the fair market value of the stock.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1361-1(l)(2).
A debt obligation, regardless of designation, is not
considered a second class of stock unless (1) the debt
constitutes equity or otherwise results in the owner being
treated as an owner of stock under general principles of
federal tax law and (2) the debt is used to contravene the
shareholders' rights to distribution or liquidation proceeds or
to contravene the limitation on the number of shareholders.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(ii).  Straight debt will
not be treated as a second class of stock, even if it would be
treated as equity, if the debt is supported by a written
unconditional promise to pay on demand or a specified date
a sum certain and (1) the interest rate and payment are not
contingent on corporation profits, corporation discretion or
similar factors; (2) the debt cannot be converted into stock;
and (3) the creditor is an individual, estate or trust described
in Section 1361(c)(2).  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(5).
Obligations which originally qualified as straight debt cease
to so qualify if the obligations are materially modified so
that it no longer meets the definition of straight debt or are
transferred to a non-eligible shareholder.  Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1361-1(l)(5)(iii).  If a C corporation has outstanding an
obligation that satisfies the definition of straight debt but
that may be considered equity under general principles of
federal tax law, the obligation is not treated as a second
class of stock if the C corporation converts to S corporation
status.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(5)(v).  In addition,
the conversion to S corporation status is not treated as an
exchange of debt for stock.
The proposed regulations contain safe harbors for
obligations issued by a corporation-
•  Unwritten advances from a shareholder not exceeding
$10,000 in the aggregate at any time, treated as debt by the
parties and are expected to be repaid within a reasonable
time are not treated as a second class of stock.  Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(ii)(B)(1).
•  Proportionately held obligations are not treated as a
second class of stock.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-
1(l)(4)(ii)(B)(2).  Proportionately held obligations are any
class of obligation which are considered to be equity under
general principles of tax law but are owned solely by the
owners of, and in the same proportions as, the outstanding
stock of the corporation.  The regulations note that
obligation owned by the sole shareholder of a corporation
are always held proportionately.
An option to purchase stock is treated as a second class
of stock if the option is substantially certain to be exercised
and (1) the option has a strike price substantially below the
fair market value of the stock on the date the option was
issued, (2) the option is transferred to a nonshareholder, or
(3) the option is materially modified.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1361-1(l)(4)(iii).  Exceptions to this rule are made for
options issued to (1) persons engaged in the lending
business for the purpose of a commercially reasonable loan
to the corporation and (2) employees or independent
contractors in connection with the performance of services
and the option is not transferable.  A safe harbor for options
is allowed for options with a strike price at least 90 percent
of the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date
the option is issued.
A corporation electing S corporation status loses its S
corporation status as of the date the corporation is treated as
having more than one class of stock.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1361-1(l)(6).
The proposed regulations are effective January 1, 1992
but do not apply to obligations, instruments or agreements
entered into on or before August 8, 1991.  56 Fed. R e g .
38391 (Aug. 13, 1991), adding Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1361-1(b) through (l).
UNDISTRIBUTED INCOME.  The court held that a
shareholder of an S corporation was liable for tax on the
shareholder's share of corporate taxable income whether or
not the shareholder received the income from the
corporation.  Knott v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-
352 .
TAX LIEN.  The taxpayers owned a homestead as
joint tenants when the one spouse incurred employment tax
liability which remained unpaid.  The IRS sought payment
of the taxes through sale of the homestead which was
transferred entirely to the nondebtor spouse for less than
adequate consideration.  The court found the conveyance to
be a fraudulent transfer conveyance because it caused the
debtor spouse to be insolvent.  The court held that the IRS
could sell the homestead under the four factors enumerated
in United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983).  First,
the sale of the debtor's partial interest would not produce an
adequate price; second the couple attempted to avoid the
consequences of the tax liability by the transfer to the
nondebtor spouse; third, the costs to the nondebtor spouse
would not be significantly greater than any other forced sale;
and fourth, the debtor and nondebtor spouses have equal
interests in the homestead.  United States v .
Bierbrauer, 936 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1991).
WITHHOLDING TAXES .  The IRS has issued
guidance for reporting requirements where third parties are
deemed employers under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 32.1(e)(3),
making the third party liable for withholding and payment
of employment taxes unless the third party transfers
liability to the employer.  Notice 91-25, I .R.B.
1991-31, 14.
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MORTGAGES
MODIFICATION.  The plaintiffs sold their farm to a
third party and took a mortgage for the amount owed;
however, the buyer did not assume the plaintiff's first
mortgage on the property.  The buyer later resold the farm
to the defendants who renegotiated the mortgage to allow
the plaintiffs only the right to recover the property without
any personal liability by the buyers on the mortgage.  After
the buyer sought to return the property to the plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs brought an action for foreclosure and a deficiency
judgment.  The plaintiffs argued that the renegotiated
mortgage was signed under duress because the plaintiffs
were still liable under their own mortgage on the property.
The court held that no duress occurred because the property
was worth more than all indebtedness at the time of the
renegotiation and the buyers merely asserted their rights that
existed.  The court also found consideration for the
renegotiated mortgage in that the plaintiffs were relieved of
the necessity of being forced to take back the property.
Isaak v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 812 P.2d 2 9 5
(Idaho App. 1990).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
WETLANDS.  The plaintiff constructed a pond by
excavation in the midst of some wetlands and later filled the
pond back in.  The Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering fined the plaintiff
$75,000, under 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.04, for filling a
pond which was "man-made by impoundment."  The court
held that the plaintiff's pond was not made by
impoundment, which did not include excavation.
Warcewicz v. Dept. of Env. Protection, 5 7 4
N.E.2d 364 (Mass. 1991).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE .  Two corporations which
were owned by the same individuals owned continuous
tracts of wooded farmland.  The corporations applied for an
agricultural use exemption from full property tax, arguing
that the tracts could be combined for purposes of the income
requirement.  The court held that the income from the two
tracts could not be combined because the tracts had separate
corporate owners.  Also, the court held that the
corporations' use of the land for farming violated the local
zoning ordinance and that this could be used to deny the
exemption.  Cheyenne Corp. v. Township o f
Byram, 591 A.2d 991 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 934 F.2d 9 8 5
(8th Cir. 1991), aff'g,  128 B.R. 246, rev'g, 1 1 6
B.R. 694 (Bankr. D Neb. 1990) (executory
contracts) see p. 139 supra.
Irvine v. U.S., 936 F.2d 343 (8th Cir .
1991), rev'g  1989-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
13,818 (D. Minn. 1989) (disclaimers) see p. 125
supra.
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